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The Choice of Trading Venue and Relative Price Impact of Institutional Trading:  





We address two important themes associated with institutions’ trading in foreign markets:  
(1) the choice of trading venues (between a company’s listing in its home market and that 
in the U.S. as an ADR); and (2) the comparison of trading costs across the two venues.  
To do so, we identify institutional trading in the United States in non-U.S. stocks (i.e., 
ADRs) from 35 foreign countries and in their respective home markets, using proprietary 
institutional trading data.  We find that for stocks traded as both ADRs and in their 
respective local exchanges, the distribution of institutional decisions in the ADR markets 
is higher for stocks with the deeper ADR market, for less complex decisions, for stocks 
with lower price impact in ADR market or overlapping trading hours, and for emerging 
market stocks. We also use a multinomial logistic model to examine the factors that 
influence institutions’ decision to trade a cross-listed stock solely in the ADR market 
versus solely in its home exchange.  We conclude that, relative to stocks that are traded 
by institutions in both venues, stocks with relatively higher local volume, with non-
overlapping trading hours, and with smaller market capitalization are more likely to be 
traded in their home exchanges only while less complex decision are more likely to be 
executed as ADRs only.  We also find that, in terms of the overall trading cost (implicit 
plus explicit), the trading cost of ADRs is often higher than that of the equivalent security 
at home.  Our multivariate analysis on institutional trading costs reveals that the cost 
difference between trading in the security’s home country and its respective ADR is 
smaller for stocks associated with less complex trades; for stocks with relatively lower 
local trading volume; for stocks with overlapping trading hours; and for stocks 






1.  Introduction   
Investment is rapidly becoming a cross-border exercise with the past decade witnessing a 
significant globalization of financial markets.  Consequently, the number of foreign companies 
cross-listing their shares in a U.S. exchange has also increased substantially.1 And institutional 
investors appear to have been the prime beneficiaries of such increased trading opportunities, 
since they have the added luxury (by virtue of their size of transactions and relatively flexible 
capital constraints) of determining which venue to trade when they decide to invest 
internationally while smaller, or retail, investors in the U.S. settle for investing in foreign stocks 
indirectly through mutual funds or through transacting a given foreign firm’s securities in the 
United States through American Depository Receipts (ADR)2  However, even though the United 
States is considered to be the largest and the most liquid market in the world, it is not clear if 
institutions would always prefer to trade a cross-listed foreign stock as an ADR in the U.S. 
market rather than trading the underlying stock in its respective home exchange.   
In a recent paper, Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2003) develop, and test, a model of 
multi market trading to explain the variation in the U.S. share of global trading volume across 
non-U.S. stocks cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.  Their key intuition is that the distribution of 
trading volume across exchanges competing for order flow is related to the correlation of the 
cross-listed asset returns with the returns of other assets traded in the respective markets.  Thus, 
the higher the correlation in returns of the cross-listed asset with the domestic asset, the more 
informative is the domestic asset’s order flow which leads both liquidity and informed traders to 
submit a larger proportion of their orders in the cross-listed asset to that exchange.  While such 
intuition is important in understanding what drives relative volume in the two markets in a macro 
sense, it sheds little light on what may be driving institutional trading decisions across the two 
markets.     
What makes the understanding of institutional trading decisions, across a firm’s home 
                                                 
1 According to Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2003), while in 1990 there were 352 non-U.S. stocks listed on the 
NYSE and Nasdaq, the number at the end of 2002 stood at around 850. 
 
2 An ADR is, for all practical purposes, a stock representing a specified number of shares in a foreign corporation. 
ADRs are bought and sold in the American markets just like regular stocks. An ADR is issued by a U.S. Bank (such 
as the Bank of New York or Chase Manhattan), consisting of a bundle of shares of a foreign corporation that are 
being held in custody overseas. The foreign entity must provide financial information to the sponsor bank.  The 
ADRs are also registered with the U.S. SEC and the companies are required to conform to GAAP in terms of their 
accounting practices.   
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exchange versus trading its ADR in the U.S. market, even more relevant is a recent qualitative 
survey by Thompson Financial and JP Morgan of 100 buy-side analysts and investors, on 
institutions’ preferences for transacting the ADRs versus local shares.  This survey reveals that 
37 percent of the respondents preferred to transact in local shares due to the generally greater 
liquidity in local markets; about 30 percent indicated they preferred ADRs due to their 
transaction efficiency and lower holding and custody costs.3  Such responses inevitably trigger 
questions like:  What are the factors driving an institution’s decision on the trading location of a 
cross-listed security? What are the relative costs of trading a foreign stock in the U.S versus 
trading the same company's stock in its home country? And what are the determinants of such 
trading cost differentials?4 Trying to answer these questions forms the basis of the current 
paper.5   
For 35 foreign countries, we obtain a matched sample of ADR versus the local stock on a 
country-by-country basis using proprietary institutional trading data from the Plexus Group over 
a period of three quarters in 2001.  To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first one 
using institutional trading data to study the choice of trading venue and relative transaction costs 
between ADRs trading in the U.S. and the underlying stocks in local exchanges. The Plexus data 
is unique because it provides information on the direction of trade (purchase versus sale), date of 
release of orders, and other details about the actual orders and trades.  This structure facilitates 
analysis of trading intention (vis-à-vis choice of trading venue, for example) and transaction 
costs directly associated with an indicated desire to trade, which cannot be accomplished with 
other publicly available datasets at transaction or aggregated levels.    
Our empirical results show that, for the underlying securities traded both as ADRs and in 
their respective local exchanges, institutions prefer to trade the ADRs for companies with deeper 
                                                 
3 The remaining 24 percent of the investors stated that the choice between ADRs and local shares is a case-by-case 
decision depending on liquidity and market accessibility. 
 
4 Note that we use the term “stock” loosely to refer to both a firm’s traded stock on its home exchange as well as to 
its equivalent security traded in the U.S. as an ADR.   
 
5 The Thompson-Morgan survey also raises other interesting questions on an individual client level such as:  How 
do institutions split their orders across the markets? Do institutions trade in both markets simultaneously?  
Unfortunately, our data are available at the individual broker level and not at the client level.  Therefore, we are 
unable to shed light on these issues.    
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ADR markets, for less complex  decisions6, for stocks with lower price impact or overlapping 
trading hours, and for emerging market stocks. We also employ a multinomial logistic model to 
examine the factors that influence institutions’ decision between trading a cross-listed stock 
solely in the ADR market and trading it solely in its home exchange.  We conclude that, relative 
to being traded in both venues, stocks with relatively higher local volume, with non-overlapping 
trading hours, and of smaller capitalization, are more likely to be traded in their home exchanges 
only, while less complex orders are more likely to be executed exclusively as ADRs. 
We also find that ADRs appear to be more expensive to trade (in terms of total trading 
costs) relative to trading the equivalent securities in their respective home exchanges. On a 
country-by-country basis, the overall (implicit plus explicit) costs of trading the ADR are greater 
for twenty countries in our sample.  For the remaining fifteen countries, the overall costs of 
trading the ADR are either smaller or statistically similar relative to trading the equivalent 
securities in their home exchanges.  
We, however, go further in attempting to delineate the drivers of the difference in total 
trading costs between the ADR and its matched underlying security in its home country.  Upon 
performing a multivariate analysis, by controlling for relevant determinants of the differences in 
trading costs between the ADR and its matched security in the respective home exchange, we 
conclude that the difference in costs between trading in the securities’ home country and in its 
ADR is smaller for (1) stocks associated with less complex trades; (2) stocks with relatively 
lower local trading volume, (3) stocks with overlapping trading hours, and (4) stocks originating 
from the emerging markets.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background 
for the current analysis.  Section 3 describes the data and provides relevant sample 
characteristics. Section 4 provides results on institutional choice of trading venue.  Section 5 
provides results on institutional trading cost differences.  Section 6 concludes.     
 
2.  Background  
Our research addresses two important themes associated with institutions’ choice of 
trading in foreign markets:  (1) the choice of trading venues (between a company’s home 
                                                 
6 We define a complex decision involving a stock as one that is relatively large in comparison to the stock’s average 
daily trading volume.   
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exchange and its ADR in the U.S.); and (2) the comparison of trading costs across these two 
venues.  The extant research on both these themes is relatively sparse.  In this section, we discuss 
the main research in both areas, especially the theoretical models which, although very stylized, 
still broadly guide our analysis.   
2.1.  Choice of trading venues 
Institutional traders often trade in significantly larger quantities than do smaller retail 
investors.  And trade size alone allows institutional traders a degree of monopoly power and the 
ability to choose which market out of all trading venues available to route their orders. Our focus 
is their choice between the ADR trading in the U.S. and the stock’s home exchange. For cross-
listed stocks, positive trading externalities might lead to a concentration of trading in a single 
market, unless some market/trade-driven frictions prevent the orders and volume to gravitate 
towards the dominant market. Therefore, there is a natural incentive for traders to converge to 
the more liquid market rather than split their trades across markets.  But while in actual markets 
consolidation is often observed, it is also true that multiple markets coexist to trade the same 
essential security with superficial differences as in cross-listed securities.  In many cases, both 
markets are active and viable.  This duality suggests that the relationship between liquidity and 
investor behavior is unlikely to be a simple one.  Market frictions in the form of informational 
asymmetries, regulatory obstacles, and differences in market structures may preclude orders 
from gravitating to a single market.    
Positive trading externalities, in the form of the presence of other traders, are important 
since it reduces the adverse price impact of one's orders, as seen in models with either 
imperfectly competitive and risk-averse investors or with asymmetric information.  The 
theoretical underpinnings of positive trading externalities lie in the models of Pagano (1989), 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and Chowdry and Nanda (1991).  In particular, and relevant to the 
current research, Chowdry and Nanda (1991) use the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) framework 
and investigate how the ability to choose where (among N possible markets) to trade might affect 
the functioning and liquidity of a market when some traders have superior information.  In 
particular, Chowdry and Nanda consider a market with informed traders, large discretionary 
liquidity traders and small non-discretionary liquidity traders.  Trading is allowed to occur 
simultaneously in multiple markets, and all traders except the small liquidity traders are 
permitted to trade in more than one market.  Under the assumption that the small traders do not 
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have the luxury of deciding where to trade (as with our case where the small investors do not 
enjoy the luxury of trading directly in the foreign markets), the trades of these small traders are 
not perfectly correlated across markets, which enables informed traders to trade aggressively in 
all markets.    
The collective empirical evidence from extant research suggests that when a security is 
traded in more than one market, the volume of trading is not evenly distributed among the 
markets. In many cases, most of the order flows and trading volume may still reside in the home 
market.  In the Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2003) model, for example, the source of volume 
differentials across the two markets is the correlation of the cross-listed asset with (the returns of 
the) other assets trading in the respective markets.  From a practitioner’s vantage point, 
Kurokawa (1988) argues: “ …large institutional investors tend to trade foreign stocks in each 
mother country, where there is greater liquidity. A major portion of the orders from non-
residents is directed to each stock’s home market.”  Additionally, Barclay, Litzenberger, and 
Warner (1990) find that for the NYSE stocks listed in Tokyo, Tokyo captured less than one 
percent of the market volume; while for Tokyo stocks listed on the NYSE, NYSE captured only 
about 8% of the volume.  More recently, Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) study the distribution 
of global trading volume in NYSE listed non-U.S. stocks, and find a large variability in the U.S. 
share of global trading, ranging from less than one percent in some stocks to more than 90% in 
others.7  Overall, U.S. trading volume appears to be higher for stocks from countries in similar 
time zones, in emerging markets, and with higher home market commission rates.8   
However, one drawback of the above studies is that they draw inferences on trading 
behavior by focusing on the total volume of cross-listed stocks.  By contrast, the unique features 
of our dataset, including a transactional glimpse on a stock-by-stock basis, allow us to examine 
how institutions trade when multiple markets exist on a stock.  In addition, by using a 
multinomial logistic regression model, we are able to estimate which factors -- including 
                                                 
7 Werner and Kleidon (1996) also investigate British stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. and find that order flow 
for cross-listed securities is segmented. Using a sample of Japanese government bonds traded in London and Tokyo, 
Tse (1999) shows that traders have a marked preference for trading in the home market.  
 
8 Another recent work by Hailing et al (2003) confirms that foreign trading are at extremely low levels, yet there is 
considerable cross-sectional variation in the persistence of the amount of foreign trading. The foreign market is also 
more active for stocks of smaller, more export and high-tech oriented firms.  
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liquidity, asymmetric information, and regulatory obstacles -- affect the probability of an 
institution’s decision to trade exclusively in one of the two trading venues.  
 
2.2.  Comparison of institutional trading costs  
The extant literature on the comparison of trading costs across international markets can 
be broadly classified into two major streams.  One stream of research examines the costs of 
trading in foreign securities in the United States.  Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), for example, 
compare the liquidity of U.S. versus non-U.S. stocks (ADRs) traded on the same exchange 
(NYSE), and find that ADRs have wider spreads, less depth and larger intraday volatility than 
comparable U.S. stocks.  Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2003) examine the effect of legal and 
political institutions on trading costs of the ADRs.  They report that the average trading costs are 
significantly higher for stocks from French-civil law countries than for stocks from common law 
countries. In addition, ADRs originating from countries with better rating for judicial efficiency, 
accounting standards, and political stability, have lower transaction costs.   
The second stream of literature, and one that the current paper belongs in, examine the 
trading costs of paired stocks in different locations.   In this relatively sparse literature, Huang 
and Stoll (2001) compare the same set of stocks traded in London Stock Exchange and NYSE 
and conclude that market characteristics such as tick size, spreads, market depth, and quote 
clustering are endogenous to the market structure. In particular, spreads are higher on trades 
executed on the dealer market (the London Stock Exchange).  However, as we have argued 
earlier, traditional measures of transaction cost (e.g., bid-ask spread) using transaction level data 
cannot accurately account for institutional trading costs.9   
 In sum, none of the existing studies offers a comparison of institutional trading costs in a 
matched setting and none asks the question (at a decision level) of which market has lower 
institutional trading costs for the same underlying security.  This is another focus of our study.  
  So, which trading venue is likely to have lower transaction costs for institutional trading? 
Some suggest that costs are likely to be lower on the stock’s local exchange than on the foreign 
stock exchange (ADRs) since most of the order flow and trading volume in the underlying 
                                                 
9 Another related stream of research examines institutional trading costs solely in international markets (see, for 
example, Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001), Perold and Sirri (1998), and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood 
(2004)).   
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company may still reside in the home market (see, for example, Barclay, Litzenberger, and 
Warner, 1990; and Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999).  Specifically, the Chowdry and Nanda 
model that we use for guidance with the current analysis predicts that if there exists more than 
one market for a security, only one will emerge as the dominant market: a “winner-takes-most” 
phenomenon.  Thus, liquidity traders will seek markets with lowest trading costs and informed 
traders will maximize profits by hiding behind liquidity trades. And given the size of institutional 
trading, it is even more critical that they trade in markets with greater liquidity, or a greater 
relative depth, for both their liquidity-motivated and information-based trading. We measure the 
relative depth of the markets using the ratio of the local volume to the total trading volume on the 
stock.  If the relative local volume is high, institutions are more likely to trade in local markets 
and trading costs are expected to be lower.   
There also exist studies that suggest adverse selection costs for ADRs may be lower than 
the corresponding stocks in their home countries because of the informational advantage of 
traders in the home markets relative to the foreign institutional investors (see, for example, Choe, 
Kho and Stulz, 1999). Therefore, trading costs should be distinct between a given ADR, and the 
corresponding locally traded stock, and that the cost difference should be a function of the net of 
the adverse selection and liquidity costs. There are also additional factors that are important in 
determining institutional trading costs in international stocks.  Lins, Strickland, and Zenner 
(2003), for example, show that firms list in the U.S. to bypass local underdeveloped capital 
markets and to make firms more valuable. The greater liquidity and efficiency of the U.S. capital 
markets make those shares originating from underdeveloped markets more accessible to 
investors. Hence, the higher volume associated with the concentrated order flows in ADR market 
is expected to lower trading costs of institutions.  Furthermore, capital controls are likely to 
restrict movement of capital across markets and reduce competition for order flows. Thus, 
trading costs are expected to differ depending on whether a country which stocks originated from 
has liberalized capital market.  Also, several papers have recently provided evidence that 
investor protections differ across countries (see, for example, La Porta, Lopez-se-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000).  Therefore, we also examine the impact of shareholder rights, and 
enforcement of insider trading laws on institutional trading costs.  
 
3.  Data and Sample Characteristics 
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We obtain a sample of institutional trading data across 35 foreign countries and their 
corresponding ADRs trading in the U.S. The data is obtained from the Plexus group, an 
independent consulting firm for institutional clients.  Over the period covered by our data, Plexus 
had 38 clients trading in international stocks.  Our institutional trading data in foreign stocks 
includes first three quarters of 2001.  The corresponding trading data in ADRs are collected from 
the Plexus US database which includes the same three quarters in 2001. The Plexus data 
pertaining to international trading is similar in their format to those pertaining to domestic 
trading in the US.  Specifically, the international data contain information on institutional 
decisions about stocks that were traded, direction of the trade (buy versus sell), quantity of shares 
desired, value-weighted average stock price on and before decision date, dates of release of 
orders from institutional clients to trading desks, prevailing stock price at the time of release, 
number of shares released, the code number of brokers used to fill the order, transaction price, 
quantity of shares traded, execution date, commissions charged, and the market capitalization of 
the stock. To maintain data integrity and to eliminate possible errors, we delete observations with 
missing prices or order quantities. In addition, following the approach of Keim and Madhavan 
(1995, 1997), we exclude orders or transactions of less than 100 shares, as well as orders for 
stocks trading under $1.00.     
We also augment our data with Datastream International stock market indices for the 35 
countries.  This enables us to control for market-wide returns.   Thus, for example, if the Finnish 
market on a given day rises significantly, then purchases in a Finnish stock in Finland are likely 
to have a greater positive price impact for purchases and a negative price impact for sales.  This 
may not be the case for the corresponding ADR trading in the U.S.  Therefore, for robustness 
purposes, our analysis also includes transactions costs computed by accounting for such market- 
wide movements.   
 Table 1 provides sample characteristics. Our unit of examination is a trading decision by 
an institution in our dataset.  Out of all the cross-listed stocks reported in Plexus database, 
institutions trade some of the stocks exclusively in local markets, and some entirely in ADR 
markets, and the remaining in both the ADR and their respective local markets. Specifically, 
there are 237 distinct stocks trading in foreign exchanges and 237 matched ADRs trading in the 
U.S. Our sample of 237 stocks covers a substantial portion of the foreign stocks cross-listed on 
U.S. exchanges as the dollar trading volume of ADRs included in our sample accounts for 
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approximately 80% of the volume of all ADRs listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX during 
the period of our study. Interestingly, institutions trade a much larger number of securities (658) 
in local markets only, while trading 94 securities exclusively in ADRs.  Institutions also appear 
to trade more frequently in local markets based on the number of institutional decisions.  For 
stocks traded in both venues (locally as well as through ADRs), the total number of decisions in 
the foreign stocks (ADRs) in our sample is 71,928 (32,251), once again indicating that the ADR 
market is used less frequently than the corresponding home market. There are also a higher 
number of decisions per stock routed to local markets. Additionally, for stocks trading in both 
venues, institutions trade more aggressively when trading stocks in local markets, as evidenced 
by the greater number of shares per decision, and a greater dollar value per decision for home 
stocks, relative to their corresponding ADRs (298,147 shares versus 61,081 shares; $2,242,823 
versus $1,440,153).  Interestingly, for stocks traded exclusively in one market, although the 
average decision shares are higher for the local-market-only stocks, the corresponding average 
decision dollar volume is smaller than those associated with ADR-only stocks.  This is consistent 
with the fact that local-market-only stocks have lower prices, as discussed below.   
For stocks that trade in one venue only, about 54.38% of the trades in the home markets 
were purchases while only about 46.51% of the ADR trades were purchases.10  Similarly, for 
stocks that are traded as both ADRs and in their home exchanges, purchase decisions in their 
local markets (as ADRs) account for 52.85% (46.60%) of the total institutional decisions.  We 
also evaluate if orders are routed differently depending on the degree of order difficulty captured 
by the metric, Order Complexity, calculated as the ratio of decision-size to the average daily 
trading volume in the previous five trading days for that stock.   We find that Order Complexity 
is, in general, significantly lower for stocks traded in both markets, relative to stocks traded 
exclusively in one market or the other. The average market capitalization numbers show that 
larger stocks are traded in both markets, while stocks traded exclusively in one venue appear to 
be much smaller.  Stocks with the lowest market capitalization, on average, are traded 
exclusively in their respective local markets.  
                                                 
10 Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argue that since an institutional investor typically has limited alternatives amongst its 
current portfolio to sell a security, such a decision does not necessarily convey negative information. In contrast, the 
choice of one specific issue to buy, out of virtually all the stocks trading in the market, is more likely to convey 
positive firm-specific news. Alternatively, they suggest that brokers are willing to facilitate institutional sells and 
accumulate long inventory position for smaller price concessions but not so willing to facilitate institutional purchases 
because they have to undertake short selling. Similar arguments are also set forth in Keim and Madhavan (1996).   
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The volume-weighted average trade price (all in U.S. dollars) is approximately $25 for 
the stocks traded in local markets and $28 for the ADRs, for those stocks traded in both markets. 
For stocks traded as ADRs only, the average share price is $48.75, while stocks bought and sold 
in local markets only have an average price of $8.19. The average daily volume for the stocks in 
local markets (ADRs) in our sample is 927,830 (106,720) shares suggesting that for stocks traded 
in both venues, the local (i.e., foreign) markets are much deeper.  In addition, the market for 
stocks traded as ADRs only is also thin with daily average volume of less than 146,800 shares.  
Overall, the ADR market appears to be significantly thinner than local markets for cross-listed 
securities.   
Trading costs are the highest for stocks traded as ADRs-only, possibly due to the larger 
decision dollar values and order complexity. The stocks traded in both markets have the lowest 
trading costs likely a result of competition among exchanges to compete for order flows. As for 
commission costs, the stocks that are traded in both venues have higher commission costs, 
possibly due to order fragmentation. Also note that the stocks traded as ADRs only have the 
lowest commission costs. We also find that, for the group of stocks in our sample that trades in 
both markets, about 76% of the total volume transacted in both markets is, in fact, in the 
respective local markets for that stock.   
In sum, the evidence in Table 1 indicates that institutions are relatively less active in the 
ADR market compared to trading the same stocks in their respective home markets.  Such a 
distinction between paired ADRs and the corresponding stocks in their respective home-markets 
is absent in the literature.   
 
4.  Empirical Results on Choice of Trading Venue 
 From the evidence presented so far, it is clear that institutions often trade both the ADR 
and the same stock in its respective home exchange.  But, what determines the distribution of 
their decisions across these two markets? We first examine this issue at country level and report 
the decision volume distribution on a country-by-country basis. In addition, we study the 
distribution of institutional decisions at the individual stock level  
 We first partition all stocks in our sample based on the relative liquidity of the markets 
for the stocks, and examine if the distribution of institutional decisions is positively correlated 
with the relative liquidity of the two markets. We also perform a regression analysis to the 
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various factors that influence the distribution of institutional decision volume across the two 
venues.  We also underscore the fact that out of the 989 distinct stocks in our sample only 237 
are traded in both venues, while the rest are traded exclusively in one market with majority of the 
stocks in local markets only.  Since we are interested in understanding why institutions forego 
the opportunity to trade in both venues and, instead, concentrate in one market only, we employ 
a multinomial logistic regression model to identify the determinants of institutional choice of 
trading venues.   
4.1.  Distribution of institutional decisions by country and by the relative liquidity in local 
and ADR markets  
 In Table 2, we provide details on the number of decisions, share volume, and dollar 
volume for all institutional trades in our sample, on a country-by-country basis, between the local 
stocks and their corresponding ADRs.   Note that the number of stocks reflects the number of 
local stocks, which is also the number of ADRs for that country.  Thus, for example, our sample 
has 5 stocks listed in Argentina and 5 Argentinean ADRs.   The range varies from 1 stock each in 
Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Philippines, Portugal, Turkey, and Venezuela, to 26 cross-listed 
stocks from Japan, 23 Brazilian stocks, and 22 stocks from the Netherlands.  In terms of 
decisions, our sample is as varied as 14,651 decisions (Japan) and 9,031 decisions (the 
Netherlands) to 9 decisions (Venezuela).  Similarly, the corresponding ADR decisions vary from 
6,727 for ADRs from the Netherlands to only 1 decision involving ADRs originating from 
Belgium.  Our sample also embraces countries where the decisions involving the home stocks 
are either greater than those involving the corresponding ADRs in the U.S. (24 countries), or 
where the reverse is true (11 countries).  This variation across countries allows us to examine the 
role of relative liquidity, information asymmetry and other country level institutional differences 
in the determination of trading venues between ADRs versus the same stocks in their respective 
home markets.   
 Dollar volume in the home market varies from $9.543 billion traded in Japanese stocks to 
$1.91 million in stocks from Venezuela. Dollar trading volume in ADRs is the highest 
Netherlands at $7.514 billion and the lowest for Belgium at $0.73 million.11  The emergent 
                                                 
11 Since one share of an ADR is not always equivalent to 1 share of the underlying stock in its home exchange, 
direct comparison of share volume is not appropriate.  Formally, the ADR ratio provides the number of foreign 
shares represented by one ADR. The ratio is typically depicted as, for example, "1:3", which implies that one share 
of the ADR represents 3 foreign shares, and so on.   
 12
message is that institutions followed by Plexus are most active in home markets for countries 
like Japan, Germany, and Netherlands.  By the same token, trading in ADRs is most active for 
stocks originating in Netherlands, followed by those from Mexico, and the UK. We also compute 
the ratio of institutional dollar volume in ADRs as a percentage of total institutional volume in 
both ADRs and local markets. The ratio varies from 1% to about 98% in ADRs.  Thus, our 
sample encompasses the entire gamut ranging from stocks with a majority of the trading in the 
local markets (e.g., Japan, Switzerland, and Hong Kong, where ADR shares is less than 2%), 
stocks where active trading takes place only as ADRs (e.g., U.K. (98%), Mexico (84%) and few 
others), and stocks with active trading present both in local exchanges and as ADRs (e.g., the 
Netherlands, with 49% of institutional volume in ADRs and 1% in local markets).     
  In Table 2, we also report the average aggregate trading volume of the cross-listed stocks 
traded as ADRs and in their respective local markets, as a measure of the depth of the market. If 
liquidity, or the depth of the market, is the primary concern of institutions, we would expect to 
see that a larger share of institutional decisions in the more liquid (i.e., deeper) venue.  Our 
results show that the average dollar volume of stocks in their home markets are about 10 times 
larger than the corresponding ADRs and, as expected, a larger share of institutional decisions 
occurs in the stocks’ local markets.  We also calculate the correlation between (a) the percentage 
of decisions (in dollars) in the local markets relative to total dollar volume of all the decisions, 
and (b) the percentage of all total dollar trading volume in local markets relative to the total 
dollar trading volume of both the local and ADR markets.  This correlation is estimated at 0.54 
and is statistically significant. Thus, institutions appear to be concentrating their trades in deeper 
markets (see, for example, Argentina and Mexico).  
A closer look at the country-level data, however, shows that institutions do not always 
trade in the market with the higher volume. For instance, for cross-listed stock originated from 
Brazil, the preferred trading venue of institutions is in the ADR market with ADRs account for 
81% of the institutional dollar volume, while the local market is deeper as indicated by a 
significantly higher share (and dollar) volume (account for 99% of the total volume).  As for 
stocks originating from the United Kingdom, much more active trading is seen in the ADR 
market rather than in the deeper U.K. market.  In a related study, Pagano, Roell, and Zechner 
(2002) report that U.K. suffers from a large net order outflow of its cross-listed stocks because of 
its high trading costs. More importantly, our findings above suggest that relative liquidity alone 
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cannot fully explain institutions' decision on where to trade. Accordingly, other relevant factors 
related to an institution's choice of trading venue are investigated for in a regression analysis 
later.   
 In Figure 1, we also plot (a) institutional trades in ADRs as a percentage of total 
institutional trades against (b) all trading volume in ADRs as a percentage of total volume, for all 
the countries in our sample. From the figure, we confirm our earlier observation that institutions 
choose to trade in the deeper market in many of the countries (e.g., Argentina, Luxemburg, 
Mexico, to name a few). However, exceptions are also seen for countries like Belgium, Brazil 
and the United Kingdom, where institutional trading is concentrated in the market with less 
overall volume.     
We proceed to explore, in detail, the correlation between the relative allocation of trading 
decisions between the respective home markets and their ADRs, and the relative liquidity across 
the two markets – on a stock-by-stock basis.  Toward this end, we further partition our sample of 
matched stocks into quintiles based on our measure of the depth of the market, calculated as the 
local volume on a stock relative to the total volume in both the local and ADR markets.  For 
these five groups, our results show that, in general, as the depth of the local market declines, so 
does the percentage of institutional decisions in the local market. Thus, for example, for the first 
quintile, which has the deepest local markets, the percentage of institutional decision is as high 
as 70.7%, while for fifth quintile, which has the least depth in the local market, only 44.7% of 
the institutional trading volume is in the local markets.  This further supports the notion that 
relative liquidity, or the depth of the alternative trading venue, is one of the important drivers of 
the distribution of institutional decision on trading venue.12  
4.2.  Determinants of trading volume across local and ADR markets 
To further understand how institutional decisions split across the local and the ADR 
market, we perform a regression analysis on the institutions' dollar trading volume of local 
market (relative to the total institutional volume in both local and ADR markets) using the 
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12 We also find, at the individual stock level, that the correlation between the percentage of local volume and the 
percentage of institutional decisions in local markets is a statistically significant 0.39.      
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where % of Local Volume is the dollar decision volume in the local market relative to the total 
decision volume of the stock in both the local and ADR markets; Complex is the difference in 
order complexity, calculated as the ratio of decision shares relative to average daily trading 
volume over the prior five trading days, in the local stock and the corresponding ADR; Price 
Impact  is the difference between the price impacts of local shares and that of ADRs; Purchase is 
the difference in percentage of purchase-to-sell decision of foreign stocks and the corresponding 
ADR; Relvol refers to the relative stock trading volume in local exchange to overall trading 
volume;  Volatility is the difference in the standard deviation of the foreign stock and the 
corresponding ADR; Overlap takes a value of 1 if the local stock and ADR have overlapping 
trading hours, and zero otherwise; Emerge takes the value of 1 for markets classified as emerging 
markets by MSCI, and zero for developed markets; CR is the index of shareholders’ rights 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 for worst to 5 for best; Liberal signifies 
whether a country has liberalized capital flow policies with minimal restrictions based on 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000); ITL takes the value of 1 if the insider trading laws have been 
enforced in the country through at least one prosecution, and zero otherwise. 
 We report our regression results in Table 3.  We find that the percentage of total local 
volume, and order complexity, are positively correlated with the percentage of institutional 
decision volume in local markets. In addition, the stocks that have higher price impact on local 
trading (compared with trading ADR) are expected to attract less trading interests from 
institutional investors. Furthermore, a stock with a higher percentage of buy orders has more of 
its orders executed in its local market.  This finding, coupled with the results reported in the 
extant literature (see, for example, Keim and Madhavan, 1995, 1997; and Chan and Lakonishok, 
1993), suggesting that institutional buys are often more informed than institutional sells,13 would 
imply that more informed trading activity should gravitate towards a stock’s home exchange 
rather than the ADR market.     
Several studies have also examined the extent of market integration by comparing spreads and 
trading volume when both the home market and the NYSE are open.  Werner and Kleidon 
(1996), for example, report that volume and volatility are much higher over the 2-hour trading 
                                                 
13 This follows since buys are supposed to be based on extensive research of the whole universe of stocks while 
sells are triggered more mechanically when target prices are hit.  
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period each day when both the London Stock Exchange and the NYSE are open.  In a related 
paper, Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) perform a similar study for a sample of Dutch ADRs and 
find that the spreads for the Dutch ADRs traded on the NYSE increase during non-overlapping 
hours, indicating that competitive pressure for order flow caused by trading on multiple 
exchanges reduces adverse selection and drives spreads down during the overlapping period. We, 
therefore, include a dummy variable, Overlap, in our regression to gauge the effect of 
overlapping trading hours on the distribution of institutional decisions. The coefficient of the 
overlapping variable is negative, and statistically significant, suggesting that, there is greater 
relative trading in the ADR market for those firms domiciled in countries sharing overlapping 
trading hours with the United States.  Also, a larger share of decisions is routed to the ADR 
market for emerging market stocks.  This finding, similar to that reported in Pulatkonak and 
Sofianos (1999), is consistent with the fact that emerging markets tend to have higher transaction 
costs (Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood, 2004).  In addition, institutions are less likely to 
have trading facilities and other infrastructure located in the local stock exchange, which makes 
trading on the NYSE more convenient. Finally, we find that the local share of institutional 
decisions is positively correlated with the proxy for the enforcement of insider trading laws. Also 
institutions appear to prefer to trade a higher percentage of their transactions in ADRs for issues 
originating from countries with liberalized capital markets and better shareholder rights.   
 4.3.    Trade in one market or in both markets?    
In forming our matched sample, we observed that institutions do not always trade cross-
listed stocks on both the local exchange and also in its ADR form.  Accordingly, in Table 1, we 
report that there are 658 stocks traded in local markets exclusively, while only 94 securities are 
traded as ADRs exclusively.  Thus, while institutions have the choice of trading in both markets, 
it is clear they do not always do so. The fact that a majority of stocks in our sample are traded 
exclusively in their respective home markets by institutions appears to be at odds with the firms' 
stated motive to list their shares on a major exchange (such as the NYSE), which is to improve 
the company’s exposure to foreign investors. Our sample seems to suggest that the targeted 
foreign investors of cross-listed firms are often individual investors. We are interested in 
discovering the factors that affect institutions’ decisions on where to trade.  We analyze the 
decision of trading the ADR versus trading the corresponding stock in its home exchange, within 
a multivariate setting using a multinomial logistic framework on a stock-by-stock basis.  In 
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particular, our dependent variable takes the value 1 for stocks that trade in the ADR market only 
and 2 for stocks that trade in the local exchange only.  Additionally, our base (or, reference) 
group comprises of those stocks in our data that were traded both as ADRs and in their 
corresponding home exchanges.  These stocks are assigned a value of zero in our analysis.  Our 
independent variables encompass similar variables used in the decision volume regression.  
Table 4 provides the estimates averaged over all stocks. It is clear that, relative to stocks 
traded in both markets, stocks traded in the ADR market solely are associated with a lower level 
of order complexity (i.e., smaller relative size), and lower relative volume.  Correspondingly, 
stocks trading solely in their home exchanges are associated with relatively smaller 
capitalization, higher relative local volume and lower volatility.  Emerging markets stocks are 
also less likely to be traded in their home exchanges exclusively.  The implication of the above 
findings is that stocks with relatively higher volume and relatively smaller market capitalization 
are more likely to be traded in their home exchanges while less complex trades, and stocks with 
lower relative local volume, are more likely to be traded in the ADR market.  The probability 
that institutions trade exclusively in ADRs (local only) is negatively (positively) associated with 
a higher (lower) price impact although this price impact does not appear to be statistically 
significant.   
 
5.  Methodology and Results on Comparison of Institutional Trading Costs    
We now turn our attention to the computation of institutional trading costs over the 
sample period.  Total execution costs comprise of an implicit cost (through the price impact 
associated with a given trade) and an explicit cost (i.e., commissions).   Unlike commissions, 
however, the price impact of a trade – the deviation of the transaction price from the 
‘unperturbed’ price that would prevail had the trade not occurred – is arguably more difficult to 
measure.  Much depends on the proper identification of the unperturbed price.  In particular, the 
trade itself should least influence the measure of price impact.  Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
discuss the importance of this issue in great detail.  One method that is popular with academics 
and practitioners alike is comparing the average price at which an order is executed with the 
unperturbed price prevailing just prior to the trading decision.  Following Keim and Madhavan 
(1997), we compute price impact at the decision level as the ratio of the volume weighted 
average trade price of the component trades (WTP) in that decision to the closing price on the 
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WTP for sells. Buy (sell) decisions executing at a 
higher (lower) average price relative to the closing price on the day before the decision would 
have a positive price impact.  Similarly, buy (sell) decisions executing at a lower (higher) 
average price relative to the benchmark price would display a negative price impact.   
Furthermore, following Jones and Lipson (2001), we also calculate the price impact at 
release level as the ratio of the volume weighted average trade price (WTP) of the component 
trades in that decision to the price prevailing at the time the institutions release an order to the 
trading desk ( rP ).  Thus price impact based on release price is calculated as 1−
rP
WTP for buys and 
)1( −−
rP
WTP for sells. Once again, positive and negative price impacts for buy and sell decisions 
are similar to those provided above.  Finally, the explicit cost is calculated as commission in 
dollars per share as a percentage of the transaction price.   
5.1. Comparisons of institutional trading costs by country  
 Panel A of Table 5 provides the implicit, explicit and total costs based on the two 
measures discussed above on a county-by-country basis.  Overall, the implicit costs of trading 
the ADR are significantly greater relative to trading the stock in his home market (0.66% versus 
0.51%).  This is true for both benchmark prices (DECISION and RELEASE).   
On a country-by-country basis, in terms of explicit costs, home markets do not appear to 
enjoy the same dominance as seen with implicit costs.  Specifically, for a majority of the 
countries in our data, commission costs of trading the ADRs are lower than those associated with 
trading the corresponding stocks in their home countries.   
Overall, the total trading costs using both implicit and explicit costs reveal that trading in 
the ADR is significantly more expensive than trading in the corresponding stock in its home 
country.   On a country-by-country basis, however, for twenty countries, the total cost of trading 
the ADR is significantly greater than trading the corresponding stock at home.  For the remaining 
fifteen countries, the total trading costs associated with trading the ADR are less than those 
incurred by trading the corresponding stocks in their respective home countries. 
There also does not appear to be a geographic pattern to our findings:  Countries like 
United Kingdom, Norway and Greece (all from Europe), Venezuela (South America), and Korea 
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(Asia) all show that trading the ADR is significantly cheaper than trading the same stocks in their 
respective home markets.  Contrarily, for countries like Japan, Indonesia, India and Singapore 
(all from Asia), Mexico (North America), and the Netherlands (Europe), the total cost of trading 
the ADR is significantly greater than trading the same company at home.   
We further attempt to compare our numbers to those reported by other studies although 
the risks of doing so are obvious in terms of ensuring the comparison of “apples-to-apples” by 
way of similar measures over the same period of time and using similar samples, etc.  In spite of 
such inherent risks, we find that trading ADRs result in a much higher implicit cost. The release-
price-based price impact for all ADR trades is 0.66%, while CJJW (2004) reports the same 
measure of institutional transaction cost of US stocks at 0.18%.  This is perhaps due to the fact 
that the stocks in our sample are traded in multiple markets and, for many countries, the winners 
are the local markets where a majority of the trading occurs.  
A possible criticism of the results presented in Panel A of Table 5 is that they are not 
adjusted for market-wide variations.  That is, if there is an overall upward market movement on a 
given day (or period) in a given country that is not reflected in the U.S. market, then a buy 
decision in the home market might lead to a greater price impact compared to a purchase 
decision of the same company’s ADR in the U.S. market.  The same argument holds for a selling 
decision made in a downward trending market of a given country that is not similarly reflected in 
the U.S. over the same period of time.   More generally, to the extent that the price impact is a 
function of the liquidity available on the other side of the trading decision (i.e., the sell side 
liquidity for a buy decision and vice versa) and to the extent that there may exist a differential 
condition across the two markets (a particular foreign market versus the U.S. market), our results 
may be skewed in one direction or another.   To see if such issues make a difference in the 
trading costs across different countries versus the U.S., we present, in Panel B of Table 5, the 
same costs adjusted for market-wide price movements.  We use the Datastream International 
stock market indices for the 35 countries from which the companies’ local stocks (and their 
corresponding ADRs) originate. The market adjusted price impact is the raw price impact for a 
decision in a particular stock in excess of the price changes on the foreign market index (of the 
market the stock originates from) between the decision date and the date when the last 
transaction in the given decision is completed.  By presenting these additional results adjusted 
for market-wide movements in each of the foreign markets represented in our data, we are able 
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to examine transactions costs with and without such market-timing costs.   Overall, our results 
remain the same qualitatively as in Panel A and attest to the robustness of our findings.   Thus, 
for example, for all stocks, the price impact (using DECISION) without factoring in market-wide 
factors were 0.51% and 0.66% for trading the stocks in the Korean markets versus their 
respective ADRs in the U.S., respectively.  After factoring in market-wide effects, the 
corresponding costs are 0.38% and 0.76%, respectively.  Overall, the price impact of the home 
stocks diminishing slightly while simultaneously increasing slightly the price impact of the 
corresponding ADR.  Collectively, such changes result in a larger gap between the price impacts 
of trading in local versus the ADR markets.  A reasonable explanation for this is likely due to the 
larger movement (i.e., higher volatility) of foreign market indices relative to the U.S.  To 
corroborate this intuition, we use Datastream International stock market indices to compute the 
volatility of foreign markets and the U.S., and find that 20 out of the 35 foreign markets included 
in our sample have considerably higher volatility than that in the U.S.  
5.2 Institutional trading costs across various partitions of the data  
In this section, we investigate institutional trading costs across trading the home stocks 
versus the corresponding ADRs for various important partitions of the data.  All partitions are 
motivated by extant research on trading costs in general and institutional trading costs in 
particular.  The results are presented in Table 6.   
 Large, medium and small stocks.  Large stocks are often the most liquid, and are 
associated with lower transaction costs while small stocks are often speculative and traded in 
thinner markets with poorer liquidity.  To see if institutional trading costs differ significantly 
along stock sizes, we partition our sample of stocks into large, medium and small by dividing the 
sample equally into three groups ranked by the market capitalization. From Table 7, we confirm 
that price impact is higher for smaller stocks, regardless the location of trades. More importantly, 
we find that overall the cost of trading the ADRs of both large and medium foreign companies in 
the U.S. is significantly higher than the cost of trading the corresponding companies’ stocks at its 
home country (0.23% versus 0.59% based on DECISION for large companies and 0.44% versus 
0.66% for medium companies).  By contrast, trading smaller stocks in ADRs appears to be 
associated with a cost savings of 0.14%.   In terms of explicit trading costs, the commissions are 
lower with ADRs than with the stocks in their home markets.  For example, the commission for 
large ADRs is 0.15% compared to 0.23% for the corresponding stocks traded in the home 
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exchange.  Similarly, for small stocks, the commissions are 0.27% in the home market versus 
0.19% in the ADR market.  The commissions in the U.S. market are smaller for small 
capitalization stocks in spite of lower relative volume, possibly due to the cross subsidization 
across stocks (ADR and domestic) by U.S. brokers. In sum, for medium and large companies, the 
total cost of trading the ADR is significantly higher than trading the same stocks in their home 
markets, while no significant difference is observed for trading small stocks in the two 
alternative venues.  This conclusion is robust to using the benchmark price given by either 
DECISION or RELEASE.    
Easy, moderate and difficult trading decisions.  We partition the sample into three equal 
groups (easy, moderate, and difficult) based on the complexity of the decision.  Decision 
complexity is calculated as the ratio of decision-size to the average daily trading volume in the 
previous five trading days for that stock.  From Table 6, we see that while the overall trading 
costs (price impact and commission) are higher for the ADRs relative to the same stocks in their 
home exchanges, they are significantly higher only for the difficult decisions.  For easy and 
moderate decisions, the costs are statistically similar.  Hence, institutions are better off trading 
difficult decisions in a stock’s home exchange rather than trading them as ADRs.   
 Buy versus sell trades.  We turn our attention to the relation between trading costs and 
the direction of trades (i.e., buy versus sell). Unlike many studies of transaction costs that rely on 
unsigned trading volume, or use the Lee and ready (1991) algorithm to infer the direction of 
trades, our unique dataset includes information on institutions' intended trade direction. 
Purchases are often considered more informative than sells and, consequently, the price impacts 
associated with a buy or a sell trade should be distinct from each other.  Thus, we compare the 
relative price impact across the two markets for the two groups, partitioned by the percentage of 
purchases relative to all trades. Interestingly, for the group with higher percentage of purchases, 
trading costs in the local markets are on average 0.18% lower than that of the ADR markets, 
showing a larger cost advantage compared with the group with relatively lower percentage of 
purchases.  
High volume versus low volume stocks.  Chowdry and Nanda (1991) posit that liquidity 
traders prefer markets with the lowest trading costs and informed traders maximize profits by 
hiding behind liquidity traders’ trades. Thus, in the presence of multiple markets, the venue with 
a higher overall trading volume is likely to offer better liquidity to institutions. We partition the 
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sample firms into two equal groups based on the local volume relative to the combined trading 
volume of ADRs and the same firm in its local market. Consistent with above argument, for 
stocks with relatively high local volume, the price impact of local stocks are considerably lower 
than its corresponding ADRs. The difference in the price impact of the two trading venues is 
0.29% and statistically significant. Moreover, for stocks with a relative high trading volume in 
the ADRs (or relatively low volume in local markets), the overall trading cost is also slightly 
higher relative to trading the same companies’ stocks in their respective home markets, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.   
Overlapping versus non-overlapping trading periods.  Foreign markets normally have 
trading hours that are different from that of the ADRs trading in the U.S.  The existence of an 
alternative trading location for stocks and the presence of overlapping trading hours between the 
firm’s home exchange and the ADR market lead to conjectures about relative liquidity and 
overlapping trading hours. Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), for example, show that the 
competitive pressure for order flow caused by trading on multiple exchanges drives spreads 
down during the overlap period. In the same vein, we expect the difference in price impact to be 
wider for stocks originating from countries with non-overlapping trading hours with the U.S. 
market. We divide our sample into overlapping and non-overlapping groups based on whether 
the local market has overlapping trading hours with the U.S.  Consistent with our conjecture, the 
difference in price impact is larger when the local market trading hours do not overlap with that 
of the ADR market.  And when market-wide price changes are adjusted for, the price impact of 
ADRs is 0.59% higher than the same set of stocks on local exchange for the non-overlapping 
group -- consistent with the findings of Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999), and Clarke and Shastri 
(2001). 14   
Developed versus emerging markets.  We also partition our data along the lines of 
developed markets and emerging markets using the Morgan Stanley Capital International’s 
(MSCI) classification system. For stocks from developed markets, we find that the overall 
trading costs of transacting the ADR are slightly higher than the corresponding stocks in their 
home markets (0.48% versus 0.41%), and the difference is not statistically significant. 
Institutional trading costs in stocks from emerging markets are much higher in ADRs (0.95%) 
                                                 
14 Werner and Kleidon (1996) also report that spreads are substantially lower for cross-listed securities in London 
during the overlap period than for their matching firms. 
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than on their local exchanges (0.67%). Thus, our results seem to indicate that institutions prefer 
to trade stocks from emerging markets as ADRs despite the higher price impact.  
5.3 Determinants of the difference in price impact 
 The significantly different price impacts displayed by institutional trading in the ADRs 
versus trading the same companies’ stocks in their home listing markets prompt us to further 
investigate the determinants of this difference. We perform a multivariate regression analysis to 
better understand the causes of the differences in trading the same firm's stock in alternative 
locations.  The dependent variable is the difference in the price impact (based on the price 
prevailing at release time) between the foreign stock and corresponding ADR.  The explanatory 
variables include the usual suspects related to order-specific and firm-specific factors.  Following 
CJJW (2004), we also include country-specific variables capturing the level of economic 
development, the level of shareholder rights protection, the state of financial liberalization, the 
legal enforcement of insider trading laws.  In particular, our empirical model is defined as 
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where PI is the difference in the measures of price impact for a foreign stock and the 
corresponding ADR; Complex is the difference in order complexity, calculated as the ratio of 
decision shares relative to average daily trading volume over the prior five trading days, of the 
local stock and the corresponding ADR; Relvol refers to the relative stock trading volume in 
local exchange to overall trading volume; Purchase is the difference in percentage of purchase to 
sell decision of foreign stocks and corresponding ADR; Volatility is the difference in the 
standard deviation of the foreign stock and the corresponding ADR; Overlap takes a value of 1 if 
local stock and ADR have the overlapping trading hours; Emerge takes the value of 1 for 
markets classified as emerging markets by MSCI, and 0 for financially developed markets; CR is 
the index of shareholders’ right constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and it ranges from 0 for 
worst to 5 for best; Liberal signifies whether a country has liberalized capital flow policies with 
minimal restrictions based on Bekaert and Harvey (2000); ITL takes the value if the insider 
trading laws have been enforced in the country through at least one prosecution. 
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 Table 7 provides the regression results.  Complex is negative and significant indicating 
that the difference in price impact is greater for more complex trades and, by implication, it is 
cheaper to trade a stock in its home country than its ADR.  Similarly, Relvol is negative and 
significant, implying that it is cheaper to trade stocks for which the relative local volume is larger 
in the local market.  It is also cheaper to trade stocks with a higher percentage of purchases in 
their respective home markets.  The difference in price impact is smaller for stocks domiciled in 
countries that have overlapping trading hours with the U.S. markets, suggesting that competition 
for order flows helps to lower trading costs.  It is cheaper to trade underdeveloped countries’ 
stocks in their home markets, although that option may not always be available.   Finally, it 
appears to be cheaper to trade stocks of countries enforcing insider trading laws in their 
respective home markets (rather than their ADRs).   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 Using proprietary institutional trading data over 2001, we investigate how institutions 
trade a firm’s stock in its home exchange versus trading the same firm’s stock as an ADR in the 
U.S.  For stocks traded as both ADRs and also in their respective local exchanges, we find that 
the distribution of institutional decisions in the ADR markets is higher for stocks with a deeper 
ADR market, for less complex orders, for stocks with lower price impact in ADR market or 
overlapping trading hours, and for emerging market stocks. We also use a multinomial logistic 
model to examine what factors drive a stock to be (1) traded solely in the ADR market, (2) 
traded solely it its respective home exchange, or (3) traded in both venues, by institutional 
investors.  We conclude that stocks with relatively higher local volume, and of smaller market 
capitalization, and non-overlapping trading hours are more likely to be traded solely in their 
home exchanges, while less complex orders are more likely to be traded solely as ADRs in the 
U.S.   
We also compare institutional trading costs between trading a foreign company’s ADR in 
the U.S. versus trading the equivalent security in its respective home market.  In terms of the 
overall trading cost (implicit plus explicit), the trading cost of ADRs is often higher than trading 
the same stock at home.  Specifically, the overall trading cost (implicit plus explicit) of trading 
the ADR is greater than trading the same firm’s stock at home for twenty countries in our 
sample.  Specifically, for countries like Japan, Indonesia, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, the 
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Netherlands, and Singapore, the total cost of trading the ADR is significantly more expensive 
than trading the same company’s stocks at home.  Contrarily, for countries like the United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Norway, Korea and Greece, trading the ADR is significantly cheaper than 
trading the same stocks in their respective home markets.   
Given that significant cost differences do exist between trading the ADR versus trading 
the equivalent security at home, we take the logical next step in determining the drivers of such 
cost differences. Our multivariate analysis on institutional trading costs reveals that the 
difference in costs (between trading in the securities’ home country and in its ADR) is smaller 
for stocks associated with less complex trades, for stocks with relatively lower local trading 
volume or overlapping trading hours and for stocks originating from the emerging markets. 
  Overall, our research sheds light on the choice of trading venues and the relative costs 
faced by institutions in trading foreign company stocks, either in the U.S. through ADRs versus 
trading the equivalent stocks in the firms’ home exchange.  To the best of our knowledge, ours is 
the first paper to attempt to do so.  Much work remains, however.  Future research can consider 
issues of correlation across world markets and its relationship to the flight to quality seen in 
recent years in some international trading arena, in order to better understand the true costs of 
trading in international markets.   
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Table 1. Institutional Trading in Foreign Stocks and ADRs 
 
Data on institutional trading in foreign stocks are obtained from Plexus Group for the first three quarters 
of 2001. This table contains sample characteristics of institutional trading in ADRs and foreign stocks 
in 35 countries. We report characteristics for three groups. Stocks traded in local market only, ADR 
only and both local markets. 
          
Both ADR & Local Trading Characteristics Local ADR Local ADR 
     
Number of Securities 658 94 237 237 
Number of Decisions 69,419 6,006 71,928 32,251 
Average Number of Decision per Security 105.50 64.49 303.49 136.08 
Average Decision Size (shares)  1,525,872 41,085 298,147 61,081 
Average Decision Size (in dollars)  630,514 724,561 2,242,823 1,440,153
     
Percentage of $ Purchase Decision 54.38% 46.51% 52.85% 46.60% 
Order Complexity (%) 52.21% 48.54% 31.19% 28.63% 
     
Average Market Capitalization (million $) 3,104 5,958 36,975 32,805 
Average Daily Volume (Number of Shares) 4,477,100 146,800 927,830 106,720 
Median Volume weighted Transaction Price ($) 8.19 48.75 25.43 28.00 
Relative Local Trading Volume 100.00% 0% 75.83% 24.17% 
Price Impact Cost (%) 0.72 1.10 0.51 0.66 
Commissions Cost (%) 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.22 
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Table 2. Overall and Country Statistics on Institutional Decisions and Trading Volume 
 
This table contains Number of stocks and Number of decisions, and dollar volume of institutional trading in ADRs and 
foreign stocks for the 35 countries. Average overall trading volume is the total dollar volume of the stock in either local 





Total institutional dollar 
volume ($ million) 
Average Overall  




Local ADR Local ADR 
% of ADR 
volume  by 
institutions
Local ADR 
% of total 
ADR 
volume 
          
All trades 237 71927 32251 53497 18832 26% 2002192 213132 10% 
ARGENTINA  5 260 448 44.7 114.6 72% 22700 47981 68% 
AUSTRALIA  7 3375 1277 1761.58 341.1 16% 367533 76855 17% 
BELGIUM  1 242 1 62.52 0.73 1% 133638 90917 40% 
BRAZIL  23 778 3526 306.71 1281.78 81% 12835228 117540 1% 
CHILE  9 32 1341 6.94 149.58 96% 8848 8993 50% 
CHINA  10 2119 798 1410.79 206.23 13% 207404 54290 21% 
DENMARK  3 1029 111 486.14 6.83 1% 260500 19027 7% 
FINLAND  3 1928 211 2334.68 220.83 9% 2071515 1533785 43% 
FRANCE  16 7470 2152 7421.81 1237.06 14% 1226435 382821 24% 
GERMANY  11 6698 186 5738.41 56.18 1% 2859492 802446 22% 
GREECE  1 280 11 169.46 3.32 2% 145165 29258 17% 
HONG KONG  9 3661 68 2134.43 15.04 1% 244027 86645 26% 
HUNGARY  1 102 106 23.65 33.55 59% 72500 14945 17% 
INDIA  6 466 446 318.09 94.8 23% 58165 80036 58% 
INDONESIA  2 177 63 47.44 14.38 23% 50344 15364 23% 
ISRAEL  3 120 181 43.27 79 65% 2940828 294894 9% 
ITALY  6 2271 364 1747.39 196.31 10% 991856 590843 37% 
JAPAN  26 14651 1314 9543.56 204.96 2% 680949 123378 15% 
KOREA  5 2073 2055 1853.85 631.36 25% 479523 442770 48% 
LUXEMBOURG  2 10 81 2.06 5.05 71% 5470 18414 77% 
MEXICO  20 1306 5489 529.18 2857.48 84% 63166 133149 68% 
NETHERLANDS  22 9031 6727 7951.32 7514.11 49% 1613267 266296 14% 
NEW ZEALAND  2 361 45 112.02 1.66 1% 59340 4678 7% 
NORWAY  3 572 81 156.49 3.6 2% 222825 55268 20% 
PHILIPPINES  1 141 238 25.54 46.62 65% 20129 24599 55% 
PORTUGAL  1 613 104 381.68 12.23 3% 534970 33413 6% 
SINGAPORE  4 1335 43 477.22 24.2 5% 157194 104312 40% 
SOUTH AFRICA  4 969 101 358.52 4.59 1% 101591 74295 42% 
SPAIN  6 3408 1120 2683.49 250.7 9% 1755990 120777 6% 
SWEDEN  5 1524 73 1321.27 57.27 4% 1258579 385744 23% 
SWITZERLAND  9 3510 494 3062.85 72.5 2% 1645643 198739 11% 
TAIWAN  6 1280 1269 902.31 536.78 37% 380305 188727 33% 
TURKEY  1 86 96 20.1 9.48 32% 717 14318 95% 
UNITED KINGDOM  3 40 1516 55.44 2506.89 98% 3507826 610653 15% 
VENEZUELA  1 9 115 1.91 41.51 96% 3991 66745 94% 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of Volume Distribution  
 
This table presents regression analysis on the institutions' dollar trading volume of local 









54321 ImPrRe%  
 
where % of Local Volume is the dollar decision volume in the local market relative to the 
total volume of the stock in both local and ADR markets; Complex is the difference in order 
complexity, calculated as the ratio of decision shares relative to average daily trading volume 
over the prior five trading days, of the local stock and the corresponding ADR; Price Impact  
is the difference between the price impacts of local shares and that of ADRs; Purchase is the 
difference in percentage of purchase to sell decision of foreign stocks and corresponding 
ADR. Relvol refers to the relative stock trading volume in local exchange to overall trading 
volume. Volatility is the difference in the standard deviation of the foreign stock and the 
corresponding ADR; Overlap takes a value of 1 if local stock and ADR have the overlapping 
trading hours. Emerge takes the value of 1 for markets classified as emerging markets by 
MSCI, and 0 for financially developed markets; CR is the index of shareholders’ right 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and it ranges from 0 for worst to 5 for best; Liberal 
signifies whether a country has liberalized capital flow policies with minimal restrictions 
based on Bekaert and Harvey (2000); ITL takes the value of 1 if the insider trading laws have 
been enforced in the country through at least one prosecution. * and *** denote significant 
level at 10% and 1%, respectively.   
 
Regression Variables Estimate 
  
Intercept 1.432 *** 
Complexity of Decision 0.610 *** 
Relative Trading Volume 0.164 *** 
Price Impact -0.032 *** 
Volatility 0.002  
Percentage Buy/Sell 0.033 * 
Overlap  -0.318 *** 
Emerging Market -0.431 *** 
Shareholder Rights -0.088 *** 
Liberalized Market -0.449 *** 
Insider Trading Laws 0.192 *** 






Table 4. Coefficient Estimates of Multinomial Logit Regression 
 
This table presents the multinomial logit regression. Stocks traded in both local and ADR markets are used as our reference group. ADR refers to stocks traded in 
ADR form only; and Local refers to stocks traded in local markets only. Cap refers to the difference in market capitalization of the foreign stock and the 
corresponding ADR; Complex is the difference in order complexity, calculated as the ratio of decision shares relative to average daily trading volume over the 
prior five trading days, of the local stock and the corresponding ADR; Purchase is the difference in percentage of purchase to sell decision of foreign stocks and 
corresponding ADR. Relvol refers to the relative stock trading volume in local exchange to overall trading volume. Volatility is the difference in the standard 
deviation of the foreign stock and the corresponding ADR; Price impact is the ratio of the volume weighted trade price of the component trades in a decision to 
the closing price on the day before the trading decision is made Overlap takes a value of 1 if local stock and ADR have the overlapping trading hours. Emerge 
takes the value of 1 for markets classified as emerging markets by MSCI, and 0 for financially developed markets; CR is the index of shareholders’ right 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and it ranges from 0 for worst to 5 for best; Liberal signifies whether a country has liberalized capital flow policies with 
minimal restrictions based on Bekaert and Harvey (2000); ITL takes the value if the insider trading laws have been enforced in the country through at least one 
prosecution. *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
                                      
  Intercept1 Cap1 Complex1 Purchase Relative Volume Volatility Price Impact Overlap 
Emerging 
Market 
                   
ADR 0.01 *** 0.01  -1.92 *** -5.62  -163.00 *** 2.18  -0.12  1.88  -0.83  
                   
Local  -0.77 *** -0.03 *** 2.72 *** -1.40  779.40 *** -1.32 *** 0.33  -2.14 *** -4.51 *** 
                                      







Table 5. Panel A: Institutional Trading Costs by Country  
 
This table reports the execution costs of institutional trading during the sample period. Total execution cost consists of implicit cost (price impact) and explicit cost (commission 
cost). Implicit cost is calculated as the ratio of volume weighted trade price of the component trades in an order relative to two benchmark prices. Decision based benchmark use 
the closing price on the day before the decision to trade is made, and the release benchmark used the price when an institution releases an order to trading desk. Explicit cost is 
calculated as commission per share relative to transaction price. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
                     
  Price Impact Commission   Total Cost 
Benchmark  Decision   Release           Decision   Release   
 Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  
                     
All trades 0.51 0.66 -0.16 *** 0.39 0.44 -0.05 * 0.21 0.22 -0.01  0.72 0.88 -0.17 *** 0.60 0.67 -0.07 * 
                     
COUNTRY                     
ARGENTINA 0.83 1.12 -0.29  0.76 0.74 0.01  0.32 0.23 0.10  1.16 1.35 -0.19  1.08 0.97 0.11  
AUSTRALIA 0.49 0.40 0.08  0.26 0.29 -0.03  0.23 0.39 -0.17  0.71 0.80 -0.08  0.48 0.68 -0.20  
BELGIUM 0.39 0.20 0.19  0.35 1.58 -1.22  0.11 0.05 0.06  0.50 0.25 0.25  0.46 1.63 -1.17  
BRAZIL 0.48 0.70 -0.22  0.15 0.62 -0.47  0.26 0.26 0.00  0.74 0.96 -0.22  0.41 0.88 -0.47  
CHILE 0.82 0.81 0.01  1.14 0.59 0.55  0.69 0.30 0.38  1.51 1.11 0.40  1.82 0.89 0.93  
CHINA 1.21 0.86 0.35  0.93 0.65 0.28  0.13 0.20 -0.08  1.34 1.06 0.27  1.06 0.85 0.21  
DENMARK 0.36 0.99 -0.63  0.47 0.36 0.11  0.17 0.15 0.02  0.53 1.14 -0.61  0.64 0.51 0.12  
FINLAND 0.14 0.72 -0.58  0.17 0.04 0.14  0.14 0.17 -0.03  0.28 0.89 -0.61  0.31 0.21 0.11  
FRANCE 0.23 0.07 0.15  0.43 0.25 0.18  0.14 0.13 0.01  0.37 0.20 0.17  0.58 0.38 0.20  
GERMANY 0.17 0.54 -0.38  0.10 -0.49 0.59  0.12 0.11 0.01  0.29 0.65 -0.37  0.22 -0.38 0.60  
GREECE 0.38 -0.44 0.82  0.35 -0.44 0.79  0.39 0.25 0.13  0.77 -0.19 0.96  0.73 -0.19 0.92  
HONG KONG 0.80 0.40 0.40  0.21 0.14 0.07  0.16 0.19 -0.02  0.96 0.58 0.37  0.37 0.32 0.05  
HUNGARY 0.30 0.41 -0.11  0.29 0.19 0.10  0.48 0.07 0.41  0.78 0.48 0.30  0.77 0.26 0.51  
INDIA 0.74 1.07 -0.32  0.15 0.50 -0.35  0.48 0.29 0.19  1.22 1.35 -0.13  0.63 0.78 -0.15  
INDONESIA 0.74 3.92 -3.17  0.33 2.50 -2.18  0.46 0.57 -0.11  1.21 4.48 -3.28  0.79 3.07 -2.28  
ISRAEL 0.73 2.30 -1.57  0.80 1.03 -0.22  0.32 0.19 0.13  1.05 2.49 -1.44  1.12 1.21 -0.09  
ITALY 0.27 -0.02 0.29  0.19 -0.15 0.35  0.10 0.17 -0.07  0.36 0.15 0.22  0.29 0.01 0.28  
JAPAN 0.27 0.52 -0.26  0.09 0.40 -0.30  0.08 0.11 -0.03  0.35 0.64 -0.28  0.18 0.51 -0.33  
KOREA 0.29 -0.26 0.55  0.13 -0.36 0.48  0.34 0.18 0.16  0.63 -0.07 0.71  0.47 -0.17 0.64  
LUXEMBOURG 0.66 0.89 -0.24  0.87 0.76 0.11  0.11 0.07 0.04  0.77 0.97 -0.20  0.98 0.83 0.15  
MEXICO 0.90 1.17 -0.27  0.72 0.64 0.08  0.24 0.41 -0.17  1.14 1.58 -0.44  0.96 1.06 -0.09  
NETHERLANDS 0.26 0.72 -0.46  0.37 0.75 -0.38  0.13 0.20 -0.07  0.39 0.91 -0.52  0.50 0.95 -0.45  
NEW ZEALAND 0.37 -1.07 1.44  0.21 0.32 -0.11  0.08 0.15 -0.07  0.45 -0.92 1.37  0.30 0.47 -0.18  
NORWAY 0.25 -0.42 0.67  0.23 -1.22 1.45  0.13 0.26 -0.12  0.39 -0.16 0.55  0.36 -0.96 1.33  
PHILIPPINES 0.61 1.01 -0.40  0.46 0.39 0.06  0.52 0.29 0.23  1.13 1.30 -0.18  0.97 0.68 0.29  
PORTUGAL 0.21 0.23 -0.02  0.13 0.40 -0.27  0.15 0.42 -0.27  0.37 0.65 -0.28  0.28 0.82 -0.54  
SINGAPORE 0.75 1.43 -0.68  0.63 1.26 -0.64  0.19 0.08 0.12  0.94 1.51 -0.57  0.82 1.34 -0.52  
SOUTH AFRICA 0.34 1.18 -0.84  0.28 1.01 -0.74  0.26 0.14 0.12  0.60 1.32 -0.72  0.54 1.15 -0.61  
SPAIN 0.28 0.14 0.14  0.18 0.11 0.07  0.14 0.21 -0.07  0.42 0.35 0.07  0.32 0.32 0.00  
SWEDEN 0.30 1.34 -1.04  0.21 0.75 -0.54  0.14 0.11 0.03  0.44 1.45 -1.01  0.34 0.86 -0.51  
SWITZERLAND 0.17 0.47 -0.31  0.22 0.66 -0.44  0.20 0.35 -0.15  0.36 0.82 -0.46  0.42 1.01 -0.59  
TAIWAN 0.78 0.68 0.10  0.45 0.47 -0.02  0.29 0.32 -0.03  1.07 1.01 0.06  0.75 0.79 -0.05  
TURKEY 0.06 2.14 -2.08  0.39 0.40 -0.01  0.12 0.99 -0.87  0.18 3.13 -2.95  0.51 1.40 -0.89  
UNITED KINGDOM 1.92 0.01 1.92  0.97 0.13 0.84  0.14 0.08 0.05  2.06 0.09 1.97  1.11 0.21 0.89  
VENEZUELA 1.16 -0.48 1.64  2.09 0.11 1.97  0.80 0.20 0.61  1.96 -0.29 2.25  2.89 0.31 2.58  
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Table 5. Panel B: Institutional Trading Costs by Country Adjusted for Market-Wide Returns 
 
This table reports the execution costs of institutional trading during the sample period. Total execution cost consists of implicit cost (price impact) and explicit cost (commission 
cost). Implicit cost is calculated as the ratio of volume weighted trade price of the component trades in an order to the closing price on the day before the decision to trade is made 
(decision) and the time the institution releases an order to trading desk (release). Explicit cost is calculated as commission per share relative to transaction price. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
                    
  Price Impact Commission   Total Cost 
Benchmark  Decision   Release           Decision   Release   
 Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  
                     
All trades 0.38 0.76 -0.38 *** 0.34 0.44 -0.10 * 0.21 0.22 -0.01  0.59 0.98 -0.40 *** 0.55 0.66 -0.11 * 
                     
COUNTRY                     
ARGENTINA 0.36 0.99 -0.64  0.67 0.73 -0.06  0.32 0.23 0.10  0.68 1.22 -0.54  0.99 0.96 0.03  
AUSTRALIA 0.49 0.54 -0.05  0.35 0.29 0.07  0.23 0.39 -0.17  0.72 0.94 -0.22  0.58 0.68 -0.10  
BELGIUM 0.46 -3.90 4.36  0.35 -1.34 1.69  0.11 0.05 0.06  0.57 -3.85 4.42  0.46 -1.28 1.74  
BRAZIL 0.58 0.82 -0.25  0.09 0.63 -0.54  0.26 0.26 0.00  0.84 1.08 -0.25  0.35 0.90 -0.54  
CHILE 0.32 0.83 -0.51  0.74 0.53 0.21  0.69 0.30 0.38  1.00 1.13 -0.13  1.43 0.84 0.60  
CHINA 1.15 0.76 0.38  1.01 0.83 0.18  0.13 0.20 -0.08  1.27 0.96 0.31  1.14 1.03 0.10  
DENMARK 0.36 0.47 -0.12  0.44 0.45 -0.02  0.17 0.15 0.02  0.53 0.63 -0.10  0.61 0.61 0.00  
FINLAND 0.08 0.57 -0.49  0.18 0.02 0.15  0.14 0.17 -0.03  0.22 0.75 -0.52  0.32 0.20 0.12  
FRANCE 0.13 -0.06 0.19  0.42 0.19 0.24  0.14 0.13 0.01  0.27 0.07 0.20  0.56 0.31 0.25  
GERMANY 0.20 0.58 -0.38  0.14 -0.34 0.47  0.12 0.11 0.01  0.32 0.69 -0.37  0.25 -0.23 0.48  
GREECE 0.53 -0.04 0.57  0.46 0.24 0.23  0.39 0.25 0.13  0.92 0.22 0.70  0.85 0.49 0.36  
HONG KONG 0.43 0.64 -0.21  0.21 0.14 0.06  0.16 0.19 -0.02  0.59 0.83 -0.24  0.37 0.33 0.04  
HUNGARY 0.03 0.54 -0.51  0.02 0.19 -0.17  0.48 0.07 0.41  0.50 0.60 -0.10  0.50 0.26 0.24  
INDIA 0.50 1.15 -0.65  0.15 0.52 -0.37  0.48 0.29 0.19  0.98 1.44 -0.46  0.63 0.80 -0.18  
INDONESIA 0.74 3.52 -2.77  0.33 2.21 -1.88  0.46 0.57 -0.11  1.21 4.08 -2.88  0.79 2.77 -1.99  
ISRAEL 0.60 2.49 -1.89  0.74 1.04 -0.30  0.32 0.19 0.13  0.92 2.68 -1.75  1.06 1.23 -0.17  
ITALY 0.29 0.26 0.03  0.23 0.08 0.15  0.10 0.17 -0.07  0.39 0.42 -0.04  0.33 0.25 0.08  
JAPAN 0.22 1.34 -1.12  0.13 0.41 -0.28  0.08 0.11 -0.03  0.30 1.45 -1.14  0.21 0.52 -0.31  
KOREA 0.18 -0.16 0.34  -0.07 -0.33 0.25  0.34 0.18 0.16  0.53 0.03 0.50  0.27 -0.14 0.41  
LUXEMBOURG -0.12 0.13 -0.25  -0.08 0.58 -0.66  0.11 0.07 0.04  -0.01 0.20 -0.21  0.04 0.65 -0.62  
MEXICO 0.75 1.31 -0.56  0.73 0.54 0.19  0.24 0.41 -0.17  0.99 1.73 -0.74  0.97 0.95 0.02  
NETHERLANDS 0.09 0.73 -0.64  0.29 0.75 -0.46  0.13 0.20 -0.07  0.22 0.92 -0.71  0.42 0.95 -0.53  
NEW ZEALAND 0.53 -1.02 1.54  0.17 0.32 -0.15  0.08 0.15 -0.07  0.61 -0.86 1.47  0.25 0.47 -0.22  
NORWAY 0.16 -0.68 0.84  0.21 -1.24 1.46  0.13 0.26 -0.12  0.30 -0.42 0.72  0.35 -0.99 1.33  
PHILIPPINES 0.05 1.09 -1.04  0.11 0.43 -0.32  0.52 0.29 0.23  0.57 1.38 -0.81  0.62 0.72 -0.10  
PORTUGAL 0.17 0.42 -0.24  0.12 0.40 -0.28  0.15 0.42 -0.27  0.33 0.84 -0.51  0.28 0.82 -0.54  
SINGAPORE 0.67 1.04 -0.36  0.60 0.98 -0.38  0.19 0.08 0.12  0.86 1.11 -0.25  0.79 1.05 -0.26  
SOUTH AFRICA 0.22 1.50 -1.27  0.30 1.04 -0.74  0.26 0.14 0.12  0.49 1.64 -1.15  0.56 1.18 -0.62  
SPAIN 0.22 0.14 0.08  0.16 0.11 0.05  0.14 0.21 -0.07  0.36 0.35 0.01  0.30 0.32 -0.02  
SWEDEN 0.29 1.16 -0.87  0.25 0.70 -0.45  0.14 0.11 0.03  0.43 1.27 -0.84  0.38 0.81 -0.42  
SWITZERLAND 0.20 0.66 -0.46  0.19 0.72 -0.52  0.20 0.35 -0.15  0.40 1.01 -0.61  0.39 1.06 -0.67  
TAIWAN 0.54 0.89 -0.35  0.32 0.68 -0.37  0.29 0.32 -0.03  0.83 1.22 -0.39  0.61 1.01 -0.40  
TURKEY -0.24 2.25 -2.49  0.51 0.41 0.10  0.12 0.99 -0.87  -0.12 3.25 -3.37  0.63 1.41 -0.77  
UNITED KINGDOM 1.00 -0.08 1.08  0.84 0.15 0.68  0.14 0.08 0.05  1.14 0.00 1.13  0.97 0.24 0.74  
VENEZUELA 0.86 -0.34 1.20  1.55 0.17 1.38  0.80 0.20 0.61  1.67 -0.14 1.81  2.36 0.37 1.98  
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Table 6.  Institutional Trading Costs by Various Partitions   
 
This table presents institutional trading costs classified by market capitalization, complexity of decision, percentage of purchase to sell decisions, local volume relative to total 
trading volume of stock, and developed versus emerging market. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
                      
    Price Impact Commission   Total Cost 
Benchmark    Decision   Release           Decision   Release   
  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  Local ADR Diff  
                      
Large 0.23 0.59 -0.36 *** 0.14 0.32 -0.19 * 0.15 0.23 -0.07  0.38 0.82 -0.44 *** 0.29 0.55 -0.26 * 
Medium 0.44 0.66 -0.22 *** 0.35 0.43 -0.08  0.21 0.25 -0.04  0.65 0.91 -0.26 *** 0.56 0.68 -0.12  Market 
Capitalization Small 0.84 0.70 0.14  0.66 0.54 0.12  0.27 0.19 0.08  1.10 0.89 0.21  0.93 0.73 0.20  
                      
Easy 0.05 0.20 -0.15  0.03 0.09 -0.07  0.13 0.14 -0.01  0.17 0.34 -0.16  0.15 0.23 -0.08  
Moderate 0.24 0.39 -0.14  0.17 0.14 0.04  0.14 0.18 -0.04  0.39 0.57 -0.18  0.32 0.32 0.00  Complexity of 
Decision Difficult 0.55 0.82 -0.28 *** 0.37 0.42 -0.05  0.19 0.25 -0.05  0.74 1.07 -0.33 *** 0.56 0.66 -0.10 ** 
                      
High 0.38 0.56 -0.18 *** 0.31 0.41 -0.10 *** 0.21 0.22 -0.02  0.58 0.78 -0.20 *** 0.52 0.63 -0.12 *** Percentage of 
Purchase to Sell Low 0.63 0.76 -0.13 * 0.46 0.47 -0.01  0.22 0.23 -0.01  0.85 0.99 -0.14 * 0.68 0.70 -0.02  
                      
High 0.47 0.76 -0.29 *** 0.34 0.49 -0.15 *** 0.21 0.22 -0.01  0.69 0.98 -0.29 *** 0.55 0.71 -0.16 *** Relative Local 
Volume Low 0.54 0.56 -0.02  0.44 0.39 0.04  0.21 0.23 -0.02  0.75 0.79 -0.04  0.64 0.62 0.03  
                      
Overlapping 0.46 0.62 -0.16  0.42 0.42 0.01  0.22 0.23 -0.01  0.68 0.85 -0.17  0.64 0.65 -0.01  
Trading Hour Non-
overlapping 
0.58 0.73 -0.15 * 0.33 0.49 -0.16 ** 0.20 0.21 -0.01  0.78 0.94 -0.16 * 0.53 0.70 -0.17 *** 
                      
Developed 0.41 0.48 -0.08  0.31 0.34 -0.03  0.13 0.18 -0.04  0.54 0.66 -0.12  0.45 0.52 -0.07  Developed 
versus 
Emerging 
Emerging 0.67 0.95 -0.28 *** 0.51 0.60 -0.10  0.34 0.30 0.04  1.00 1.25 -0.24 *** 0.85 0.90 -0.06  
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Table 7.  Regression Analysis of Price Impact 
 
This table presents regression analysis on the differences of price impact of institutional using the 









7654321 Re  
 
where PI is the difference in the measures of price impact for a foreign stock and the corresponding 
ADR; Complex is the difference in order complexity, calculated as the ratio of decision shares 
relative to average daily trading volume over the prior five trading days, of the local stock and the 
corresponding ADR; Purchase is the difference in percentage of purchase to sell decision of foreign 
stocks and corresponding ADR. Relvol refers to the relative stock trading volume in local exchange 
to overall trading volume. Volatility is the difference in the standard deviation of the foreign stock 
and the corresponding ADR; Overlap takes a value of 1 if local stock and ADR have the 
overlapping trading hours. Emerge takes the value of 1 for markets classified as emerging markets 
by MSCI, and 0 for financially developed markets; CR is the index of shareholders’ right 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and it ranges from 0 for worst to 5 for best; Liberal signifies 
whether a country has liberalized capital flow policies with minimal restrictions based on Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000); ITL takes the value if the insider trading laws have been enforced in the country 
through at least one prosecution. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively. 
   
Regression Variables Estimate 
   
Intercept -0.741 *** 
Complexity of Decision -0.263 *** 
Percentage Purchase to Sell -1.252 *** 
Relative Trading Volume -1.051 *** 
Volatility -0.002  
Overlap  0.468 *** 
Emerging Market -0.566 ** 
Shareholder Rights 0.212 ** 
Liberalized Market 1.391 * 
Insider Trading Laws -0.610 * 
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% Institutional dollar volume in ADR
% Overall dollar volume in ADR
 
